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CASE NOTES
jury's participation in the process. "The jury is ordinarily in a better
position. . . to determine whether outrageous conduct results in mental
distress . . . . From their own experience jurors are aware of the extent
and character of the disagreeable emotions that may result from the de-
fendant's conduct."'
0 3
The Hubbard court discarded the jury's determination of UPI's outra-
geous conduct and Hubbard's severe distress.104 The Restatement's stan-
dard, the exclamation "outrageous!" by an average member of the
community,105 supports substantial deference to ajury's findings. Jurors
are average members of the community, presumed to have knowledge of
that which is deemed intolerable conduct in a civilized society.106
The Minnesota Supreme Court has belatedly joined the ranks of the
majority in recognizing the independent tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Regretably, the court's application of the "new tort"
fails to provide clear guidance. Yet, despite its rather inhospitable debut,
Minnesota's "new tort" offers protection against emotional distress in an
increasingly pressure-packed society. Although not every injured feeling
can be compensated, the societal requirement of a "toughened mental
hide" is no longer a barrier to a claim of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.
Torts-RECOGNITION OF NEGLIGENT HIRING EXPANDS EMPLOYER LIA-
BILITY-Pontcas v. KM.S Investments, 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983).
At common law, the tort liability of an employer to his employee was
limited to certain minimum obligations.' The fellow servant rule im-
posed liability when an employer's own negligence injured his employee,
but precluded employer liability when a fellow servant's negligence in-
103. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286
(1952). But see Theis, The Intenttinal In'ction Of Emotional Distress." A Need For Limits on
Liability, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 275, 289 (1977) (severity of distress found dependent on
background of each juror).
104. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
105. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 46 comment d.
106. But see Appellant's Brief at 136. "Tort liability cannot be pegged to notions of
decency or morality which are subject to the same sort of vicissitudes as hemlines or hair
length." Id.
1. The common law duties of the master for the protection of his servants were as
follows: 1) to provide a safe workplace; 2) to provide safe tools and equipment; 3) to give
warnings of dangers probably unknown to the servant; 4) to provide sufficient numbers of
suitable fellow servants; and 5) to issue and enforce rules for the conduct of employees to
make the workplace safe. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 60 (4th ed.
1971). The injured worker's recovery was further limited in cases of employer negligence
by the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule.
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jured an employee.2 Critics attacked this rule as contrary to the estab-
lished policy holding employers vicariously liable to third persons for
servants' torts committed within the scope of employment.3 As its hard-
ship on employees became apparent, the fellow servant rule gradually
deteriorated and greater relief was provided for injured employees.4
2. The fellow servant rule stated that an employer was not liable for injuries to a co-
worker caused by an employee. Id Employers who knowingly employed or retained unfit
and dangerous employees were excepted from the rule. Compare Lunderberg v. Bierman,
241 Minn. 349, 356, 63 N.W.2d 355, 360 (1954) (fellow servant rule absolves employer
from liability to his employees for injuries suffered solely because of a co-employee's negli-
gence) with Ryan v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 60 111. 171 (1871) (exceptions to fellow
servant rule based on employment of knowingly incompetent servants).
3. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at § 60. This "established policy" is known as the
agency doctrine of respondeat superior. The doctrine has long been recognized in Anglo-
American law. See generally Brill, The Liability of an Employer for the Wilfiul Torts of His
Servants, 45 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1968) (defining doctrine of respondeat superior and
liability imposed on employers).
Justice Holmes traced the doctrine's origin to ancient Greek and Roman law where a
master either surrendered the tortfeasing agent or provided just compensation. 0.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 8-10 (1881). Under respondeat superior, the employer's
liability is not dependent in any way upon the fault of the master. Brill, supra, at 1; see
Porter v. Grennan Bakeries, Inc., 219 Minn. 14, 21, 16 N.W.2d 906, 909-10 (1944). In
Porter, the court said, "Proof of personal fault of the master is not permissible under allega-
tions predicating liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior." Id at 23, 16
N.W.2d at 910. For an analysis of respondeat superior as a cause of action, see Laski, The
Basiu of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916).
The master's liability for injuries resulting from a servant's negligence rests upon the
proposition that the master is responsible for wrongful acts of his servant committed while
the servant is acting under his implied authority, and not for the servant's acts when the
latter is engaged exclusively in his own affairs. Ploetz v. Holt, 124 Minn. 169, 144 N.W.
745 (1913); Sina v. Carlson, 120 Minn. 283, 139 N.W. 601 (1913) (master is liable for torts
of servant committed in the course and scope of his employment). See generally W. PROS-
SER, supra note 1, § 70. One author criticized the agency theory of liability as contrary
to notions of common sense because of the absence of the principal's ratification of the
agent's act. Holmes, The History ofAgency, 5 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1891).
In Minnesota, an employer was once liable under respondeat superior if the tortious
act was requested by the employer or incident to the employee's duties. Liability may
now be imposed for acts related to the employee's duties and occurring within work-re-
lated limits of time and place. Lange v. National Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 211 N.W.2d
783 (1973). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2i9 (1958) (master's lia-
bility for torts of his servants).
Respondeat superior and fellow servant law are based on different theories of liabil-
ity. Respondeat superior holds the employer liable, not for his own acts, but vicariously
for those of his employees. A cause of action based on fellow servant law places liability on
the employer for his own acts of negligence in retaining or hiring incompetent employees.
See infra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. See generally Note, The Responsibilhty of Employers
for the Actions of Their Employees. The Negligent Hiring Theory of Liabil'ty, 53 CHI-KENT L.
REV. 717 (1977).
4. Originally, the employer's duty was to provide a safe workplace for his employees.
See supra note 1;see, e.g., Missouri K. &T. Ry. v. Day, 104 Tex. 237, 136 S.W. 435 (1911)
(emphasizing duty to provide safe conditions on the railroad).
This duty was later expanded to require the employment of safe co-employees. See,
[Vol. 10
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A further development in fellow servant law allowed employees who
were injured by co-employees to recover from their employers when the
latter failed to exercise reasonable care by retaining a dangerous5 or in-
competent employee. 6 Over the past fifty years, the scope of an em-
ployer's responsibility gradually has been extended beyond fellow
servants to include business invitees,7 persons having a special relation-
ship with the employer, 8 and the general public.9 The majority of juris-
dictions also have expanded the employer's duty to include the exercise
of reasonable care in hiring employees.O Today, in most states, employ-
e.g., Najera v. Southern Pac. Co., 191 Cal. App. 2d 634, 13 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1961) (where
railroad employee recovered for injuries sustained as a result of carelessness of fellow em-
ployee); see also Note, supra note 3, at 719. See generalo 53 AM. JUR. Master and Servant
§§ 302-12 (1970); 56 C.J.S. Master and Servant §§ 311-19 (1958) (competency of co-em-
ployee or fellow servant).
5. See, e.g., Najera v. Southern Pac. Co., 191 Cal. App. 2d 634, 13 Cal. Rptr. 146
(1961) (employer liable to employee for injuries proximately caused by employer's negli-
gent hiring and retention of violent co-employee); Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915 (D.C.
1951) (employer liable for employee's attack on plaintiff even though attack was outside
scope of employment because employer had duty to hire only safe and competent
employees).
6. See, e.g., Pullaman v. Bangor Mining Co., 121 Minn. 216, 141 N.W. 114 (1913)
(employer negligent in retaining an unfit servant with knowledge of servant's incompe-
tence); Kundar v. Shenango Furnace Co., 102 Minn. 162, 112 N.W. 1012 (1907) (plain-
tiff's injuries caused by master's negligence in failing to exercise reasonable care to employ
a competent engineer). See generally Loftus, Employer's Duty to Know Deficiencies of Employees,
16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 143 (1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213(b) (1958)
(employer's liability for employing improper persons).
7. See, e.g., Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 556, 46 N.W.2d 382 (1951) (customer in
gas station); Priest v. F.W. Woolworth Five & Ten Cent Store, 228 Mo. App. 23, 62
S.W.2d 926 (1933) (customer in five and ten cent store). See generally Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d
372 (1954) (liability of employer for personal assault on customer, patron, or other
invitee).
8. See, e.g., Fleming v. Bronfin, 104 A.2d 407 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1954) (plaintiff
alleged negligent hiring against employer of deliveryman who injured her while delivering
groceries); Coath v. Jones, 277 Pa. Super. 479, 419 A.2d 1249 (1980) (plaintiff recovered
on theory of negligent hiring against employer of electrician). In Coath, the court held
that if an employer was negligent in hiring the alleged rapist and, if it was foreseeable that
such employee, even after his discharge, could attack a customer because he had previ-
ously entered her home while on the employer's business, there would exist a special rela-
tionship between the employer and injured customer. Id
9. See generally Note, supra note 3, at 720-21 (development of fellow servant law).
10. See, e.g., Becken v. Manpower, Inc., 532 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1976); Texas Breeders &
Racing Ass'n v. Blanchard, 81 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1936); Argonne Apt. House Co. v. Garri-
son, 42 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1930); Nivens v. Sievers Hauling Corp., 424 F. Supp. 82
(D.N.J. 1976); Thompson v. Havard, 285 Ala. 718, 235 So. 2d 853 (1970); Svacek v. Shel-
ley, 359 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1961); Kassman v. Busfield Enters., 131 Ariz. App. 163,639 P.2d
353 (1981); Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982); Abraham
v. S.E. Onorato Garages, 50 Haw. 628, 446 P.2d 821 (1968); Easley v. Apollo Detective
Agency, 69 Ill. App. 3d 920, 387 N.E.2d 1241 (1979); Stricklind v. Parsons Stockyard Co.,
192 Kan. 360, 388 P.2d 824 (1963); Evans v. Morsell, 284 Md. 160, 395 A.2d 480 (1978);
Hersh v. Kentfield Builders, Inc., 385 Mich. 410, 189 N.W.2d 286 (1971); Strauss v. Hotel
1984]
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ers are liable to third persons for all injuries proximately resulting from
their negligent hiring and retention of employees."1
In Ponticas v. KM.S Investments, 12 the Minnesota Supreme Court recog-
nized negligent hiring as a new cause of action in Minnesota tort law.13
Minnesota employers now have a duty to exercise reasonable care in hir-
ing individuals who, because of their employment, represent a possible
threat of injury to others.14
The Ponticas court sustained a jury verdict finding that defendant Sky-
line Builders (Skyline) breached its duty by not investigating ajob appli-
cant more thoroughly,1 5 and that the breach was the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries.16 The majority also held the "inherent nature"17 of
negligent hiring precluded a defense of superseding intervening cause of
plaintiff's injuries.18
In June 1978, Skyline19 hired Dennis Graffice and his wife as resident
managers of an apartment complex owned by defendant K.M.S. Invest-
Continental Co., 610 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. App. 1980); F & T. Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M. 697, 594
P.2d 745 (1979); Vanderhule v. Berinstein, 285 A.D. 290, 136 N.Y.S.2d 95, modified 284
A.D. 1089, 136 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1954); Dempsey v. Walso Bureau, Inc., 431 Pa. 562, 246
A.2d 418 (1968); Wishone v. Yellow Cab Co., 20 Tenn. App. 229, 97 S.W.2d 452 (1936);
Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). But see Central
Truckaway Sys. v. Moore, 304 Ky. 533, 201 S.W.2d 725 (1947) (rejected negligent hiring
cause of action).
11. See supra note 10.
12. 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983).
13. Id at 911. The Ponticas court chose to align itself with the majority of jurisdic-
tions recognizing negligent hiring and the authors of the Restatement of Agency who state, "A
person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability for
harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless: . . .(b) in the employment
of improper person or instrumentalities in work involving risk of harm to others." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958).
See Becken v. Manpower, Inc., 532 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1976) (establishing negligent
hiring cause of action in Illinois when employer hired two known felons to move contents
of jewelry store); Kendall v. Gore Properties, 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (cause of
action recognized where incompetent painter was allowed to work unsupervised and only
superficial investigation was made before hiring); Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co., 192
Kan. 360, 388 P.2d 824 (1964) (liability imposed where employee possessed known
proclivities toward dangerous practical jokes); Mallory v. O'Neil, 69 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1954)
(incompetent caretaker shot a tenant outside his scope of employment); Strawder v. Har-
rail, 251 So. 2d 514 (La. App. 1971) (employee on parole from penitentiary shot customer
during argumentative sale of cigarettes); ef RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 317 (1934) (em-
ployer has duty to exercise reasonable care in controlling employee when employer knows
or has reason to know of employee's proclivity and the necessity to control).
14. Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 911.
15. Id. at 908-09, 915.
16. Id at 915.
17. See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
18. 331 N.W.2d at 915-16.
19. In addition to Skyline Builders, defendants to the suit included K.M.S. Invest-
ments. Skyline Builders managed the apartment complex that K.M.S. Investments
owned. Skyline's agents hired Graffice. Id at 909-10.
[Vol. 10
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol10/iss2/10
CASE NOTES
ments. 20 Mr. and Mrs. Graffice received a passkey permitting entry to
all apartments in the complex.21 The action arose when Dennis Graffice
sexually assaulted Stephanie Ponticas after using his passkey to enter her
apartment.
22
Before hiring Graffice, defendant interviewed him 23 and checked his
credit rating.24 Skyline contacted the owner of an apartment complex
where the Graffices had been resident managers for a short time and the
car wash where Graffice had worked for three months. 25 In addition,
Graffice completed an application form inquiring into his past employ-
ment, military service, criminal record, and references.
26
Graffice had been convicted of receiving stolen property in California
and of armed robbery and burglary in Colorado.27 When he applied for
20. Id, see infra note 30. The managerial duties included showing and renting apart-
ments, doing minor repairs, taking care of other tenant complaints, and overseeing other
employees. 331 N.W.2d at 909.
21. Id There were 198 units in the complex.
22. Id Two days earlier, Graffice had repaired the Ponticas' refrigerator at the re-
quest of Stephanie Ponticas. Upon questioning Mrs. Ponticas, Graffice learned that Mr.
Ponticas was in northern Minnesota performing in a band and would be gone for a week.
With this knowledge, Graffice entered the Ponticas' apartment in the early morning
hours. Id
While sexually assaulting Mrs. Ponticas, Graffice attempted to strangle her. She es-
caped and reported the incident to the police. Mrs. Ponticas alleged that she suffered
physical and emotional injuries, and her husband alleged loss of consortium damages.
Graffice was later arrested and convicted of first degree criminal sexual conduct. Id
23. Id at 910. Delores Swanson, Skyline Builder's property manager, interviewed the
Graffices and was the primary agent involved in the hiring. Id
24. Id Defendants checked Graffice's credit rating in Minnesota and in California
where he previously resided. Id
25. Id at 914. Graffice and his wife had worked for appellants for over five weeks
before the Ponticas incident occurred. They were doing an acceptable job. Based on
Graffice's job performance up to that time, appellants apparently had no reason to ques-
tion Graftice's suitability for the job. Appellant's Brief And Appendix at 5, Ponticas v.
K.M.S. Investments, 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983).
26. 331 N.W.2d at 914. Graffice's application showed that he had resided in Minne-
sota for about six months; he had received a general discharge from the Army after only
fourteen months-a time period shorter than the normal term; and he had no work his-
tory other than for three months in Minnesota during the five years following his dis-
charge. Graffice listed his mother and sister as references, and indicated he had criminal
convictions for "traffic tickets." The agent conducting the interview did not consider traf-
fic violations to be crimes and did not investigate further. Id
27. Id at 909. In California, Graffice was charged with burglary and receiving stolen
property. He was convicted of the latter and served four and one half months in jail.
Shortly after being released from jail, Graffice moved to Colorado where he was charged
with two counts of armed robbery, two counts of burglary, three counts of theft, and one
count of theft of auto parts. After plea negotiations, he was convicted of armed robbery
and burglary and was sentenced to prison. Id
In June 1977, Graffice was released from prison. He returned to California where he
worked as a self-employed operator of a tree service. In January 1978, he, his wife, and
child moved to Minnesota. Graffice worked as a bus driver when he first came to Minne-
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the job with Skyline, Graffice was on parole and under the supervision of
the Minnesota Department of Corrections.28 He did not disclose this in-
formation to defendant. 29 Skyline hired Graffice rather hurriedly when
its chosen applicants refused the position.30 One month later, Graffice
entered Stephanie Ponticas' apartment and raped her at knife point.
3 1
Mr. and Mrs. Ponticas brought suit against Skyline Builders and K.M.S.
Investments alleging negligent hiring.
32
On appeal, the Ponticas court addressed three issues. First, whether
Minnesota recognized a cause of action for negligent hiring, and if so,
what duty is imposed on the employer.3 3 Second, whether the evidence
supported the verdict that Skyline breached this duty.34 Third, whether
Graffice's criminal actions were a superseding intervening cause of plain-
tiff's injuries.35
The majority adopted negligent hiring as a cause of action and defined
the employer's duty as set forth below.3 6 It affirmed the jury verdict
against Skyline and held that negligent hiring precluded application of a
superseding intervening cause.
3 7
In recognizing an independent tort action for negligent hiring, the
court imposed a duty on employers "to exercise reasonable care in view
of all the circumstances in hiring individuals who, because of the employ-
ment, may pose a threat of injury to members of the public." 38 Writing
for the majority, Justice Kelley reasoned that this duty parallels the em-
ployer's duty in a negligent retention action.3 9 Since 1898, Minnesota
sota, but was fired after one month for drinking on the job. He then obtained a job as a
line foreman at a car wash where his wife also worked. Id
28. Id at 910.
29. Id Graffice testified that he did not disclose his felony convictions because he
wanted the job. He further testified that had he been asked to sign an authorization
releasing his criminal record he would have refused and no longer pursued the job. Id.
30. Upon discovering that its chosen applicants no longer wanted the position, de-
fendant called the Graffices and gave them twenty minutes to accept or reject the position.
Id
31. See supra note 22.
32. Stephanie and Jorge Ponticas brought this action against defendants (appellants)
K.M.S. Investments and Skyline Builders. They alleged that defendants were negligent in
hiring Graffice as manager of Driftwood Apartments, and that as a direct result of such
negligence Stephanie sustained physical and psychological injuries and Jorge sustained
damages for loss of consortium. 331 N.W.2d at 909. The jury found Skyline negligent in
hiring Graffice and awarded Stephanie Ponticas $75,000.00 in damages. Jorge Ponticas
was awarded $15,000.00. Appellants' Brief And Appendix at 3, Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invest-
ments, 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983).
33. See infra notes 38-49 and accompanying text.
34. See infia notes 50-83 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
36. 331 N.W.2d at 908-09.
37. Id at 915-16.
38. Id at 911.
39. Id As early as 1898, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that an employer was
[Vol. lO
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has recognized the negligent retention tort. In its present form, the tort
creates a duty of reasonable care employers owe to third parties for negli-
gently retaining dangerous or incompetent employees, and a resulting
personal liability for employers who breach the duty.40
In formulating the elements of negligent hiring, the Ponticas court
found support from other jurisdictions that recognize the tort.41 It ex-
pressly relied on two of three elements of negligent hiring common to
other jurisdictions.42 First, the plaintiff must come in contact with the
employee as a direct result of the employment.43 Second, the employer
must receive a benefit, even though potential or indirect, from the con-
tact between plaintiff and the employee.44 The court summarily dis-
liable for the acts of an incompetent employee when the employer knowingly retained or
employed the careless worker. Jensen v. Great N. Ry., 72 Minn. 175, 75 N.W. 3 (1898); see
Nutzmann v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 78 Minn. 504, 81 N.W. 518 (1900) (a prima facie
case is made against the employer by demonstrating unfitness and incompetence of em-
ployee at the time of hiring); see also Porter v. Grennan Bakeries, 219 Minn. 14, 21
N.W.2d 906, 909-10 (1944) (negligent retention action was recognized, but recovery disal-
lowed because case was pleaded under doctrine of respondeat superior); Travelers' Indem.
Co. v. Fawkes, 120 Minn. 353, 358, 139 N.W. 703, 705 (1913) (employer has duty to
"prevent damage by dissolute or reckless employees" and to take proper steps when hav-
ing knowledge of employee's dangerous proclivities); Pullaman v. Bangor Mining Co., 121
Minn. 216, 141 N.W. 114 (1913) (employer negligent in retaining employee known to be
incompetent).
40. See supra notes 6 and 39.
41. 331 N.W.2d at 911;see supra notes 10 and 13.
42. Generally, jurisdictions recognizing negligent hiring have required three ele-
ments. They are: (1) the third party must meet the employee as a result of the employ-
ment; (2) the employer must be the potential recipient of a benefit, direct or indirect,
arising from the meeting between the third party and the employee; and (3) the employee
and the third party must be rightfully at the meeting's location at the time of the injurious
act. When any one of these elements is absent, liability has not been imposed on the
employer. See Note, supra note 3, at 721-26.
43. 331 N.W.2d at 911. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Hewitt-Robbins, Inc., 13 Ill.
App. 3d 641, 301 N.E.2d 78 (1973) (employee's personal use of company automobile be-
yond scope of employment sufficiently removed him from employment making his meet-
ing with third party extraneous to that employment and absolving employer from
liability); see also Olson v. Staggs-Bilt Homes, Inc., 23 Ariz. App. 574, 534 P.2d 1073
(1975) (employee, hired only to patrol building subdivisions of employer, who shot third
party was acting outside scope of his employment freeing employer from liability for negli-
gent hiring). See generally supra notes 6 and 39.
44. 331 NW.2d at 911. The benefit to be received by the employer must be suffi-
cient. In Linden v. City Car Co., 239 Wis. 236, 300 N.W. 925 (1941), the employee, a taxi
driver, became enraged upon losing a fare and attacked the red-cap who had directed the
potential passenger to another car. There the court stated:
Had [employee's] act constituted merely an over-zealous attempt to get pa-
tronage it may be that his misplaced zeal could be accounted for . . . by [the
employer's] encouragement of active competition and its payment of such a low
wage scale as would compel such competition. Here, however, the act was whol-
ly unconnected with the discharge of his duties that no intent to further his em-
ployment can be inferred and the employment contributed only to his presence
at the place of assault. Concededly this is not enough. This was simply a tort
committed during the time of this employment.
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posed of these two issues finding that Graffice's responsibilities as
apartment manager brought him into direct contact with plaintiff-tenant
and conferred a benefit on defendant.
45
The court did not expressly adopt a third element common to other
jurisdictions,46 the requirement that the plaintiff and employee had a
legal right to be at the location where and when the injury occurred.
4 7
This element limits an employer's liability to persons whom the employer
could foresee his employee would encounter.48 Notwithstanding the ab-
sence of an express adoption of this element, Justice Kelley may have
impliedly adopted it by stating that Stephanie Ponticas, as a tenant in
defendant's apartment complex, was a "foreseeable plaintiff."49
Having established the duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring em-
ployees and the elements of negligent hiring, the majority examined the
evidence to determine whether defendant breached this duty. 50 The
standard of review employed by the court permitted the verdict against
Skyline to stand unless it was "manifestly and decidedly contrary to the
evidence as a whole."51 As a preliminary matter, Justice Kelley stated
that the evidence must show the employee was "unfit" given the type of
employment and the risk posed to persons who would foreseeably en-
counter the employee.5
2
The Ponticas court analyzed breach of duty in terms of foreseeability
Id. at 239, 300 N.W. at 926. See generally supra notes 6 and 39.
45. 331 N.W.2d at 911. The Ponticas court found that K.M.S. received a benefit
from Graffice's employment because he helped in the upkeep of the property and aided
the tenants with their complaints of "property malfunctions." Id.
46. See supra note 42.
47. See Hansen v. Cohen, 203 Or. 157, 276 P.2d 391 (1954) (plaintiff's unlawful use of
employer's premises-playing craps in employer's parking lot-exempted employer from
liability for assault committed by employee attendant).
48. See Parry v. Davison-Paxton Co., 87 Ga. App. 51, 73 S.E.2d 59 (1952). In Pary,
two deliverymen of defendant broke into plaintiff's house intending to rob her. They used
defendant's company truck and pretended to be delivering furniture for which they had
forged a sales receipt. They planned to use their employment as deliverymen to justify
their act if caught. The court upheld a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint, reasoning that
such an act could have been performed by any two persons, regardless of their employ-
ment, and as such, defendant's alleged negligence in hiring the employees was not the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Id
49. 331 N.W.2d at 912-13; see also infa notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
50. 331 N.W.2d at 912-15.
51. Id at 912. The Ponticas court relied on Flom v. Flom, 291 N.W.2d 914 (Minn.
1980), and Smith v. Carriere, 316 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982). The Floam and Smith courts
held that a jury verdict must not be overturned unless no evidence reasonably supports it.
52. 331 N.W.2d at 912. K.M.S. admitted Graffice's unfitness for the position as
apartment manager. The employee's unfitness was evidenced by the commission of the
injurious act. Id.
The employee's incompetence may be demonstrated by "a lack of training and expe-
rience, a physical or mental infirmity, frequent intoxication, constant forgetfulness, habit-
ual carelessness, continual inattentiveness, a propensity for horseplay, recklessness, or
maliciousness." Note, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 435, 441 (1980).
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and standard of care.5 3 Justice Kelley first stated that the employer need
not foresee plaintiffs particular injury.54 He found it foreseeable that
someone like Graffice, with a history of violent crimes, could commit an-
other violent crime although he had not previously committed the par-
ticular type of offense causing the injury.55 Thus, the court concluded
that Graffice's violent sexual crime against Stephanie Ponticas was
foreseeable.5
6
Based on the determination that the risk of injury was foreseeable, the
majority found it clear that Stephanie Ponticas was a foreseeable plain-
tiff.5 7 The court reaffirmed the common law test of duty, as expressed by
Justice Cardozo: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty
to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others
within the range of apprehension."5 8 Accordingly, the Ponlicas court
concluded it was foreseeable that Stephanie Ponticas, as a tenant in de-
fendant's apartment building, would encounter Graffice, the apartment
manager.59
The most troubling issue in Ponticas was whether Skyline knew or
should have known of Graffice's incompetence when it hired him.60 The
court stated that employers are not liable for failure to discover informa-
53. 331 N.W.2d at 912-15.
54. Id at 912; see Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 95 N.W.2d 657 (1959)
(convention hotel liable for injuries suffered by passing pedestrian struck by object falling
from a conventioner's window); Albertson v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 242 Minn.
50, 64 N.W.2d 175 (1954) (particular injury suffered as a result of a fall from stairs of
railroad car not foreseeable).
55. 331 N.W.2d at 912. Other jurisdictions have indicated there must be a logical
connection between the information available to the employer and the harm suffered by
plaintiff. See, e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 727 (citing Argonne Apt. House Co. v. Garrison,
42 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1930) (court held prior convictions for intoxication did not
indicate employee would steal jewelry)).
56. 331 N.W.2d at 912.
57. Id
58. Austin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 Minn. 214, 217, 152 N.W.2d 136, 138
(1967) (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928)).
In Austin, a cleaning lady unsuccessfully sued for injuries resulting from a fall in a hallway
where a pile of waste was located. Id at 215, 152 N.W.2d at 138. The Austin court held
that "it would not be reasonable to say that the manner in which defendant set aside its
waste paper involved a danger to one whose duty it was to remove it." Id at 217, 152
N.W.2d at 138. "The duty to exercise care is dictated by the exigencies of the occasion as
they are or should be known, and if no harm should be anticipated as a consequence of the
act, there can be no negligence." Id
59. 331 N.W.2d at 912. A foreseeable plaintiff is a person with whom the employer
could anticipate the employee would come in contact by virtue of his employment. See
Baugher v. A. Hattersley & Sons, Inc., 436 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind. App. 1982) (employer
owed no duty to third party raped by employee because employee did not come in contact
with victim by virtue of employment). Set generally Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y.
339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (duty owed only to those plaintiffs within scope of danger).
60. 331 N.W.2d at 412 n.6. Several jurisdictions have indicated that based on the
circumstances presented, an employer need only have constructive knowledge of an em-
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tion that could not have been discovered by reasonable investigation;
however, they must make a reasonable investigation.61 The majority
stated that the scope of the investigation relates directly to the severity of
risk employees pose to third parties.
62
In evaluating the severity of the risk, the court distinguished among
the potential threats presented by the activities of a yardperson and a
production line worker, compared with those of an apartment man-
ager.6 3 Only slight care may be required in hiring a yardperson or pro-
duction line worker whose employment involves no access to others'
living quarters.64 The majority found that Kendall v. Gore Properes65 in-
volved a risk analogous to that posed by Graffice's activities.66 In
Kendall, a painter who had access to a tenant's apartment, strangled
her.67 The Kendall court imposed liability on the apartment owner for
failing to exercise reasonable care in hiring the painter.68 The owner had
neglected to make even a cursory investigation of the painter whose em-
ployment involved direct contact with the tenant. 69
The Ponticas court emphasized that regardless of the employment cir-
cumstances, employers have no independent affirmative duty to investi-
gate an applicant's criminal record.7 0 The majority indicated, however,
that a criminal record investigation is reasonable if other factors advise
ployee's unfitness. See Note, supra note 52, at 441 n.51 and accompanying text. A few
jurisdictions have required actual knowledge. Id
61. 331 N.W.2d at 912-13. A reasonable investigation is that which would have been
made by the average employer for a particular job. Whether an employer has satisfied his
duty of reasonable care depends on whether he has conducted an investigation commensu-
rate with the risk to the public inherent in the employment. Id
62. Id; see Comment, Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entnstment: The Case Against Exclu-
sion, 52 OR. L. REv. 296, 299 (1973) (sliding scale standard of care varies according to
type of employment and likelihood of injury to third parties).
While the standard of reasonable care is objective, the conduct necessary to meet the
standard is not. The conduct of the reasonable man will vary with the situation con-
fronting him. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 32. Consequently, employers must use
care in hiring employees commensurate with the risk of injury posed to third parties by
the employment. See, e.g., Kendall v. Gore Properties, 236 F.2d 673 (D.D.C. 1956) (em-
ployer must exercise more care in hiring painter to work after hours in single woman's
apartment than in hiring yardperson); Williams v. Feather Sound, Inc., 386 So. 2d 1238
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (employer must use more care in hiring employee to work in
residential building than in hiring employee to work in yard).
63. 331 N.W.2d at 913.
64. Id The employer would not foresee the injurious act of a yardperson nor would
its occurrence be sufficiently aided by the employment. See supra note 48.
65. 236 F.2d 673 (D.D.C. 1956).
66. Id
67. Id at 678. The painter was allowed to work after hours in the tenant's apartment
without supervision. Id
68. Id. at 679.
69. Id. at 678.
70. 331 N.W.2d at 913. Justice Kelley stated that an investigation on an otherwise
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it.71 Whether an employer exercised reasonable care given the totality of
circumstances surrounding the hiring is a fact question for the jury.
72
The majority discussed at length the evidence before the jury.73 Graf-
fice's application disclosed his early discharge from the Army, contained
only a three month work history, and listed two relatives as "work refer-
ences." 74 According to the Ponticas court, the jury could have concluded
that inquiry into these facts would have alerted an employer making a
reasonable investigation of a possible criminal record. 75 Since the suspi-
cious facts on Graffice's application had not led Skyline to inquire into
his criminal record, the majority affirmed the jury's conclusion that de-
fendant breached its duty of care by failing to make a reasonable investi-
gation when hiring Graffice.76
The court next concluded that defendant's negligent hiring was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.77 It emphasized that the foresee-
ability of threat of injury imposed liability on the employer for "any in-
jury" proximately resulting from the employment.78 The majority relied
on 79 Christianson v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapo/is & Omaha Railway,80 in
which the court held that "if the act itself is negligent, then the person
guilty of it is equally liable for all its natural and proximate conse-
quences, whether he could have foreseen them or not."81 Again, a par-
"sufficient basis [that] ... conclude[s] the employee is reliable and fit for the job" elimi-
nates an affirmative duty to research the candidate's criminal history. Id.
In several jurisdictions the failure to discover the applicant's criminal record was in-
adequate to impose liability when the applicant's work record indicated competence for
the job. See Evans v. Morsell, 284 Md. 160, 395 A.2d 480 (1978) (employee's work refer-
ences established competency for job as bartender); Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578
S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (recommendation from the respected Texas Rangers
established employee's competency for employment as armed guard); Strawder v. Harrall,
251 So. 2d 514 (La. App. 1971) (employee's work record established competency for job as
gas station attendant). See generally Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 359 (1973) (noting significance of
employer's knowledge of employee's criminal record as effecting cause of action).
71. 331 N.W.2d at 913. If Skyline had researched Graffice's named references and
discovered that they were his mother and sister, this information would have alerted
K.M.S. to a series of incomplete application responses which should have triggered a crim-
inal record investigation. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
72. 331 N.W.2d at 913.
73. Id at 913-14.
74. Id at 914. Graffice's references were his mother and sister. These persons are
considered inappropriate employment references. Id; see supra note 26.
75. 331 N.W.2d at 914. Had defendant asked the Minnesota Department of Correc-
tions for information on Graffice, it would have learned he had committed an offense. Id




80. 67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896).
81. Id at 97, 69 N.W. at 641. Proximate cause is defined in Minnesota as conse-
quences which follow in unbroken sequence, without an intervening efficient cause, from
the original negligent act. For such consequences the wrongdoer is responsible, even
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ticular foreseeable injury need not have occurred. The essential element
is that the employment provide the contact between the employee and
the injured third party.
8 2
Finally, the court held that the inherent nature of a negligent hiring
cause of action precludes the application of a superseding intervening
cause.8 3 For an act to be considered intervening, it must neither result
from the original negligence nor be reasonably foreseeable to the original
wrongdoer.8 4 Justice Kelley wrote that once the duty, its breach, and the
proximate cause of injury are established, a superseding intervening
cause is precluded.8 5 A finding of proximate cause means, in this con-
text, that the negligent hiring caused the injury.8 6 By definition, a
breach of duty is established where the employer could foresee that the
employee would commit the injurious act.8 7 The Ponticas court, having
found proximate cause and breach of duty, concluded that a jury in-
struction on superseding intervening cause was unnecessary. 88
Justice Scott, joined by Justice Wahl in the dissenting opinion, ac-
knowledged that negligent hiring was a feasible cause of action, but ex-
pressed concern because the particular decision was "extremely far-
reaching." 89 Since Graffice's criminal act was best characterized as an
"unforeseeable intervening efficient cause," 9o the dissenting Justices con-
cluded that defendant's hiring was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries.91 They relied on the principles that ordinarily one can assume
though he could not have foreseen the particular results. Id. at 97, 69 N.W. at 641; see also
In re Polemis, 3 K.B. 560 (1921) (first case to state that direct cause is proximate cause).
82. 331 N.W.2d at 915. Justice Kelley stated that the negligence in hiring was the
only reason Graffice was on the property and had contact with Stephanie Ponticas. Id.
83. Id at 915-16.
84. Id The Ponticas court stated that four elements are required for the defense of
superseding intervening cause. First, the act's harmful effects must have occurred after the
original negligence. Second, the act must not have been brought about by the original
negligence. Third, the act must have actively resulted in consequences not otherwise fol-
lowing from the original act. Fourth, the act must not have been reasonably foreseeable
by the original wrongdoer. Id; see Kroeger v. Lee, 270 Minn. 75, 78, 132 N.W.2d 727,
729-30 (1965).
85. 331 N.W.2d at 915-16.
86. Id at 916. The essence of the cause of action is that.the negligent hiring provided
the employee with the circumstances to commit the wrongful act. See supra notes 43, 44
and 48.
87. 331 N.W.2d at 915-16; see supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
88. 331 N.W.2d at 916-17.
89. Id at 916. In criticizing the majority opinion, Justice Scott said, "The decision is
extremely far-reaching and the ramifications suggested are extensive. All types of scena-
rios can be imagined where an employer would be liable for the crimes of another, includ-
ing homicide, under this decision." Id
90. Id
91. Id The dissent quoted Christianson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 67 Minn. 94,
69 N.W. 640 (1896). Chnrtianson was also cited by the majority. See supra notes 79-81 and
accompanying text.
The two opinions agreed on the rule of law-that a wrongdoer is responsible for the
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people will obey the criminal laws, and that any unforeseeable criminal
act of a third party creates an intervening cause breaking the chain of
causation.
92
The dissent rejected the majority's assertion that Graffice's criminal
proclivities were foreseeable.93 Specifically, it objected to the majority's
grouping of all violent crimes into one "foreseeable" category,94 implying
that Graffice's past convictions for violent theft did not sufficiently fore-
shadow his sexual assault.95 The dissent further stated that employers
should be able to rely on the criminal justice system's efforts to rehabili-
tate convicted criminals.96
Finally, Justices Scott and Wahl expressed concern for the potential
reduction in the employment of past criminal offenders. 9 7 They opined
that employers would be unwilling to employ individuals with criminal
records for fear of incurring liability,98 and that the inability of past of-
fenders to obtain employment would only lead to greater recidivism be-
consequences of his negligence even though he could not have foreseen the particular
injury-but disagreed on its application to the facts. The dissent viewed Graffice's act as
unforeseeable by reasoning that "ft]he failure to investigate the criminal record of an ap-
plicant for employment does not render it reasonably foreseeable that the hired individual
will commit a violent crime." 331 N.W.2d at 916. Apparently, the dissent did not agree
that Skyline should have known of Graffice's criminal record.
92. 331 N.W.2d at 916.
93. Id.; see supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (majority's reasoning). The dis-
sent relied on Hilligoss v. Cross Cos., 304 Minn. 546, 228 N.W.2d 585 (1975), which held
that a criminal act was not reasonably foreseeable, and therefore, was an intervening
cause. Id at 548, 228 N.W.2d at 586. In Hiligoss, a landlord posted a notice on a tenant's
door indicating that the lock had been changed. The tenant was in the hospital and
remained there four days after the posting. Id at 546, 228 N.W.2d at 585. On his return,
several items of personal property were missing. The tenant alleged that the posting of the
notice alerted the criminal third party to his absence and resulted in the subsequent theft.
Id at 547, 278 N.W.2d at 585. The court held that the theft was not reasonably foresee-
able to the landlord. Id at 548, 228 N.W.2d at 586.
94. 331 N.W.2d at 916; see supra note 54 and accompanying text. The dissent indi-
cated that there must be a direct connection between the information available to the
employer and the employee's injurious act. 331 N.W.2d at 916.
95. 331 N.W.2d at 916. The dissent quoted section 364.03 of the Minnesota Statutes
as an important consideration. Id The statute, as quoted, provides that "no person shall
be disqualified from public employment . . . because of a prior conviction of a crime or
crimes, unless the crime or crimes for which convicted directly relate to the position of
employment sought .... " Id; see MINN. STAT. § 364.03 (1982).
96. 331 N.W.2d at 916. But see Note, supra note 52, at 448 (citing ANNUAL CHIEF
JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE, A PROGRAM FOR PRISON REFORM: THE FINAL
REPORT (1972)) (the United States Supreme Court and numerous scholars have noted the
almost nonexistent rehabilitative achievement of the criminal justice system).
97. 331 N.W.2d at 916-17. The Pont&cas majority also expressed this concern. It rea-
soned that by not mandating a criminal record investigation, past offenders would not be
discriminated against. Id at 913.
98. Id at 916-17. The dissent stated that the majority decision will stifle the work of
such organizations as Amicus and PORT which help find jobs for former convicts. Id
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cause of incomplete rehabilitation.99 The dissent reasoned that a more
narrowly drawn negligent hiring cause of action would ease the burdens
on employers, past offenders, and the public at large. 100
The adoption of a negligent hiring cause of action in Ponlicas is consis-
tent with prior Minnesota case law.10 1 During this century, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court has become increasingly concerned with protecting
the general public from risks of injury beyond the public's control. This
attitude has encouraged the court to create liability where none previ-
ously existed, in order to shift the financial burden for risks of injury
from the general public to other parties who can more effectively reduce
the risks. 102
The Ponticas decision increases the employer's burden of reasonable
care in hiring. Employers are now required to make thorough investiga-
tions of job applicants when their employment places third parties in
potential danger. This increased burden may lead to more extensive in-
vestigations into and greater reliance on employment applicants' crimi-
nal records. In view of all the circumstances, however, the social benefits
of adopting a negligent hiring action outweigh its social costs. Although
a negligent hiring tort may make it more difficult for some former con-
victs to obtain certain types of jobs, it will provide the general public
with additional protection against dangerous employees and irresponsi-
ble employers. Nevertheless, the standard of care should be narrowly
defined to avoid placing an undue burden on employers.
The ruling in Ponticas should not be applied to all employment posi-
tions. The court's distinctions between the responsibilities of an apart-
ment manager and a yardperson illustrate the ruling's proper applica-
tion.103 The tort of negligent hiring, as defined in Ponticas, should be
read to include the requirement that both plaintiff and defendant have a
legal right to be where the injury occurs. 104 For instance, an employer
should not be responsible for the harm caused by a yardperson who bur-
glarizes someone's home. In the wake of Ponlicas, two issues need further
clarification: whether and when an employer has a duty to investigate a
99. Id at 917.
100. Id at 916-17.
101. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
102. For example, in Dean v. St. Paul Union Depot, 41 Minn. 360, 43 N.W. 54 (1889),
the court held that plaintiff, who was assaulted by defendant employee, stated a cause of
action for negligent retention. Id at 362-63, 43 N.W. at 55. The court stated that employ-
ers were required to maintain their premises in a "safe condition for those who legiti-
mately came there." Id at 363, 43 N.W. at 55. Since Dean, the court has increased legal
protection of the public by imposing liability on used car dealers who fail to test used cars
for defects before reselling them, and on manufacturers who place defective products on
the market. See McLeod v. Holt Motors, Inc., 208 Minn. 473, 294 N.W. 479 (1940); Mc-
Cormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
103. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
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potential employee's criminal record105 and which crimes are foresee-
able. 106 A minor property crime, for example, should not necessarily in-
dicate a proclivity toward a serious crime against a person. Liability for
negligent hiring based on an employer's knowledge of a candidate's crim-
inal history is justified only if the employer's duty is sufficiently defined.
Further definition of the employer's duty of investigation and scope of
foreseeable crimes will create a just balance between the rights of the
employer, the employee, and the public.
105. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
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